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Note
The Mandated Move From Institutions to
Community Care: Olmstead v. L. C.
I. INTRODUCTION
Larry McAfee, a twenty-nine year old civil engineer, became a
quadriplegic as a result of a motorcycle accident.1 During the four years
following his accident, he was transferred from institution to institution
like a "sack of potatoes." 2 The state in which he lived refused to pay for
community-based living services for him and only paid for the cost of
nursing home care even though he was not ill and did not require any
institutional care.3 In the nursing home, he was told when to eat, when
to sleep, and even when he could watch movies on television.4 Because
of these restrictions on his life, he requested the right to be removed
from his life-sustaining respirator. 5 Immediately after Mr. McAfee was
placed in a community-based setting, however, he changed his mind
about suicide. 6
Mr. McAfee's account of his time spent in a segregated nursing home
is not unusual.7 Others in the disabled community have withstood
abuse, isolation, and segregation for hundreds of years, despite this
country's attempt to prohibit such treatment. With the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the disabled community, for
1. See Steven A. Holmes, Disabled People Say Home Care Is Needed to Use New Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1990, at A4.
2. See Peter Applebome, An Angry Man Fights to Die, Then Tests Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1990, at Al.
3. See id.
4. See Joseph Shapiro, Larry McAfee, Invisible Man: The Agonizing Fight to Prevent Legal-
ized "Suicide, " U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 19, 1990, at 59, 60.
5. See Holmes, supra note 1, at A4.
6. See id.
7. See generally Brief for ADAPT, National Council on Independent Living, as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Respondents, 1999 WL 106726, Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No.
98-536) (providing accounts of individuals with disabilities who were unnecessarily confined to
institutions, where they received cruel and abusive treatment).
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the first time, felt they received adequate civil rights protection.8 Now,
almost ten years after the passage of the ADA, the Supreme Court in
Olmstead v. L.C.9 concluded that unnecessary segregation of mentally
disabled individuals constitutes discrimination under Title II of the
ADA and that states must provide qualified disabled individuals with
community-based treatment if such treatment is most appropriate to the
needs of the individual. 10 As a result, many mentally disabled
individuals, like Mr. McAfee, will be able to interact with the non-
disabled community and live independent and productive lives." No
longer will these individuals be forced to remain hidden from the rest of
society, and no longer will they be subject to the restrictive living
arrangements that Mr. McAfee experienced in the nursing home.12
This Note begins with a brief examination of the lengthy history of
discrimination against disabled individuals in the United States. 13 It
then discusses § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which is
Congress' largest pre-ADA attempt to eliminate discrimination against
the disabled. 14 This Note then reviews a brief history of the ADA. 15
Next, this Note examines the case of Olmstead, exploring both the
majority's and dissent's interpretation of the definition of discrimination
under the ADA. 16  Moreover, this Note discusses the affirmative
defense available to the states when the transfer of qualified mentally
disabled individuals is too costly to the states' budgets. 17 Next, this
Note illustrates why the majority in Olmstead correctly construed the
ADA to prohibit unnecessary institutionalization of the mentally
disabled and the reasons why the dissent incorrectly concluded that the
definition of discrimination under the ADA does not prohibit
unnecessary institutionalization. 18  This Note then shows that the
transfer of qualified mentally disabled individuals into community-
based settings will not result in an increased financial burden for the
8. See Holmes, supra note 1, at A4.
9. Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999), affirming in part and vacating in part 138 F.3d
893 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
10. See id.
11. See id.; see also infra Part V.B (discussing the positive effects of community-based treat-
ment on individuals with disabilities).
12. See Holmes, supra note 1, at A4; see also infra Part II.A (discussing the historic discrimi-
nation experienced by individuals with disabilities).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.C.1-2.
17. See infra Parts m.C.l.b, fII.C.2.b.
18. See infra Part V.A.
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states because community care, on average, costs less than institutional
care and the states will be able to receive financial assistance to provide
community care through the Medicaid "Waiver" program. 19 Finally,
this Note discusses the positive effects of community-based treatment
settings on qualified individuals with mental disabilities.
20
II. BACKGROUND
Disabled Americans have experienced horrific discrimination for
hundreds of years, and for much of that time, society accepted this cruel
treatment.2 1  In the latter half of the twentieth century, however,
Congress began to recognize that disabled individuals need protection
against discriminatory treatment. 22 One of Congress' first attempts to
protect the disabled community from discrimination was the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.23 This Act, however, covered only public
entities that received federal funding. 24 As a result, in 1990, Congress
passed the ADA in order to ensure that disabled Americans receive the
civil rights protections they deserve. 25
A. Historic Discrimination Against the Disabled
Historically, states have unnecessarily confined individuals with
mental illness, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, and other
disabilities to institutions and shunned them from society.26 Throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, society widely accepted
this discrimination and unnecessary confinement.27  Much of this
19. See infra Part V.A.2.
20. See infra Part V.B.
21. See infra Part II.A (examining the historic discrimination of the disabled in the United
States).
22. See infra Part II.A (outlining early congressional attempts to protect the disabled from
such discrimination).
23. See infra Part Il.B (discussing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its protection against
discrimination for the disabled community).
24. See infra Part I.B (highlighting the shortcomings and deficiencies of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973).
25. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act and the protections it
provides to individuals with disabilities).
26. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Movement to Integration,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 399 (1991). Individuals with mental illness, mental retardation and other
disabilities are distinct populations although the groups often overlap. See id. Because these
populations have shared similar historical discrimination and are often similarly treated under the
ADA, they are grouped together here.
27. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461-63 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Cleburne Living Center, a unanimous
Court held that "retarded individuals cannot be grouped together as the 'feebleminded' and
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acceptance resulted from the social views and literature produced by
leading medical authorities and other professionals who portrayed
individuals with disabilities as "unfit for citizenship," "feebleminded,"
and a "menace to society and civilization ... responsible in a large
degree for many, if not all, of our social problems." 28  Medical
authorities advocated for the segregation of disabled individuals to
minimize the economic burden that disabled individuals placed on
society and to rid society of the "moral losses" that had arisen because
disabled people lived within society. 29
States adopted this negative view toward individuals with disabilities
and, shortly thereafter, almost completely segregated the disabled
population from the rest of the community. 30 This institutionalization
and segregation occurred, in large part, to house individuals with
disabilities for their entire existence, thereby preventing them both from
co-mingling with society and from reproducing. 3 1
deemed presumptively unfit to live in a community." Id. at 455. Justice Marshall observed that
persons with disabilities "have been subject to a 'lengthy and tragic history' of segregation and
discrimination that can only be called grotesque." Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)).
Justice Stevens similarly acknowledged "a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment" of
the disabled. Id. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
28. Id. at 462-63 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. See id. at 462-63 n.9 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Historically,
it was believed that the segregation of disabled individuals would not only minimize the "men-
ace" that disabled individuals posed to society but would "relieve society of 'the heavy economic
and moral losses arising from the existence at large of these unfortunate persons."' Id. (quoting
Act of March 22, 1915, ch. 90, 1915 Tex. Gen. Laws 143 (repealed 1955)).
30. See Cook, supra note 26, at 400.
In virtually every state .. . people with disabilities-especially children and
youth-were declared by state lawmaking bodies to be 'unfitted for companionship
with other children,' a 'blight on mankind' whose very presence in the community was
'detrimental to normal' children, and whose 'mingling ... with society,' was 'a most
baneful evil.'
Id. at 400-01 (footnotes omitted).
31. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). In Cleburne Living Center, Justice Marshall explained the historical roots of societal
discrimination of the disabled: "[S]tate mandated segregation and degradation soon emerged ...
[and] [m]assive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life; the aim was to
halt reproduction of the retarded and 'nearly extinguish their race."' Id. (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Around the turn of the century, this country implemented a public
policy of mandatory sterilization of persons with disabilities in order to avoid "being swamped
with incompetence." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). In Buck, Justice Holmes found that
"[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or
to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind." Id. This systematic segregation of individuals who were deemed to be
inferior was not limited to persons with disabilities. See Cook, supra note 26, at 404. The far
more publicized apartheid in the United States was based on race, when the Supreme Court le-
gally authorized the establishment of "separate but equal" government services for whites and
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During the 1950s and 1960s, both policymakers and professionals
began to recognize that segregation and isolation of the disabled
offended fundamental notions of decency. 32  These emerging views
stemmed from societal recognition of the needs of disabled World War
II and Korean War veterans. 33  Advocates of social security and
rehabilitation sought to expand services to this newly enlarged disabled
community. 3
4
In 1954, Congress passed the Vocational Rehabilitation
Amendments, 35  which expanded existing rehabilitation programs by
adding clinics for speech, hearing, cardiac and other disabilities.
36
Disability rehabilitation programs continued to grow and included
special education programs and the removal of architectural barriers for
those with physical disabilities. 37 With the emphasis on integrating the
disabled into the community, many of the newly developed programs
mirrored those adopted by the civil rights movement.38  Neither the
advocates of the disabled nor the advocates of civil rights, however, saw
either movement as relevant to the other.39 Therefore, the disabled were
not included as a protected class in the landmark Civil Rights Act of
1964. 40 With the growing tendency to require federally assisted
coloreds in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Cook, supra note 26,
at 404. The Jim Crow system established after Plessy bears striking resemblance to the system-
atic segregation of the disabled, and ample historical records illustrate that disability discrimina-
tion was born out of the same attitudes and prejudices that existed with respect to race. See id.
32. See Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
and Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 925,
929 (1994).
33. See Larry E. Craig, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Prologue, Promise, Product and
Performance, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 205, 207 (1999).
34. See id. After World War I and prior to the 1950s, the government's attitude toward the
disabled began to change. See id. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920 was evidence of
this change of attitude. See id. Although this Act served to match state dollars for providing job
training, counseling, and placement services to the veterans of the War, it did not include medical
services. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 207-08.
39. See id. at 208.
40. See id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act bans employment discrimination and makes it
illegal for an employer to discriminate against an individual with respect to his or her compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, sex,
national origin, or religion. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2194-95 (1999), affirming in
part and vacating in part 138 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1998); see also CLINTON L. DOGGETr & Lois
T. DOGGET, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 51 (1990). Specifically,
Title VII bans disparate treatment, which is the purposeful exclusion of members of a certain
statutorily described group from jobs. See DOGGETT & DOGGET, supra, at 72. This treatment
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construction and transportation in order to accommodate the disabled,
however, the idea surfaced that disability policies could be rights-
based.41
B. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In 1973, as Congress discussed the Vocational Rehabilitation Bill, it
added a last-minute sentence to the bill, tacking on a civil rights
provision.42 This provision is known as § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 ("§ 504"). 4 3 Section 504 prohibits federal executive agencies,
the United States Postal Service, or any other program or activity that
receives federal funding from discriminating against an otherwise
qualified individual solely on the basis of his or her disability.44 The
enforcement of § 504 was to be accomplished through regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General.45
From a civil rights perspective, § 504 represented a major historical
shift in disability policies.46 For the first time in American history,
Congress recognized disabled individuals as a minority group that had
been subject to discrimination and that deserved basic civil rights
occurs when a member of a certain group is treated differently in comparison to similarly situated
individuals outside of the statutorily described group. See id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
did not make it unlawful to discriminate against an individual based on a physical or mental dis-
ability. See id. at 51.
41. See Craig, supra note 33, at 208.
42. See id.
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). The aim of § 504 was to develop and implement "compre-
hensive and coordinated state of the art programs of vocational rehabilitation" and "independent
living" for individuals with disabilities in order to maximize their integration into the workplace
and the community. See id. § 701(b). The Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning and sig-
nificance of § 504 and has concluded that it outlaws both intentional and unintentional discrimi-
nation. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297 (1985).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Rehabilitation Act, in part, states:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall solely
by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Execu-
tive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id.
45. Originally, the Department of Health Education and Welfare was authorized to coordinate
such regulations, but the authorization was subsequently transferred to the Department of Health
and Human Services and then to the Attorney General. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,
330 (3d Cir. 1995). One of the regulations promulgated mandates that all recipients of federal
financial assistance "shall administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appro-
priate to the needs of qualified handicapped persons." 28 C.F.R. § 41.51 (d) (1999).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
448-49.
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protections.47 Congress first proposed § 504 as an amendment to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and its language virtually mirrored the
wording used in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.48 Courts have
considered this provision, often referred to as "the civil rights bill of the
disabled," as the first broad federal statute aimed at eradicating
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.49
Although referred to as the "cornerstone of the civil rights movement
of the mobility-impaired, 5 ° § 504 suffers from shortcomings and
deficiencies, which became apparent soon after its passage. 51 For
example, it only covered federally-funded entities. 52 Critics have also
found that it has inadequate enforcement mechanisms. 53  Thus, the
courts erratically have interpreted whether the provision mandates the
institutionalization of individuals with disabilities. 54  Furthermore,
47. See id.
48. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 295 n.13. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars dis-
crimination based upon race, color, or national origin in federally assisted programs. See Con-
solidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 626 (1984).
49. ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1187 (3d Cir. 1989).
50. Id. at 1205 (Mansmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 11, at 47; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 18 (1989). Indeed, Con-
gress took note of these deficiencies, specifically finding that "[c]urrent Federal law is also inade-
quate" to address "the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are fac-
ing." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 1I, at 47.
As a remedy for segregated public services, the Rehabilitation Act and its contempora-
neously enacted regulation have been practically a dead letter. We still see, in almost
every school district across the country, just as many students with disabilities ex-
cluded and segregated from the public schools their siblings and neighbors attend, de-
spite the mandatory regulation requiring otherwise.
Cook, supra note 26, at 394 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 300.552(c) (1990)).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
53. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Robert L. Burgdorf, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights
Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 431 (1991)). "Section 504 is both ambiguous and
lacking in specifics." Disabled in Action v. Sykes, 833 F.2d 1113, 1117 (3d Cir. 1987).
54. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, at *23-24,
1999 WL 149653, Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536). "[P]rior to enactment
of the ADA, there was no settled judicial understanding concerning whether section 504 prohib-
ited the unjustified segregation of persons with disabilities in institutions." Id.; see also P.C. v.
McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041-42 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 504 does not prohibit unjusti-
fied segregation); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1299
(D.N.M. 1990) (unjustified segregation not prohibited by § 504), rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 980
(10th Cir. 1992). For decisions that held or assumed that § 504 requires community placement in
certain circumstances, see Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Conn., 674 F.2d 582, 585
(6th Cir. 1982); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 213 (D.N.H. 1981); Lynch v. Maher, 507 F.
Supp. 1268, 1278-80 (D. Conn. 1981); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd,
451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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§ 504 does not express whether isolation or segregation of persons with
disabilities is a form of discrimination.55
Toward the end of the 1980s, Congress recognized that § 504 was
"inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that
people with disabilities are facing." 56  The House of Representatives
addressed the need for legislation to protect individuals with
disabilities. 57  Both the House of Representatives and the Senate
concluded that a need remained to devise legislation to end the
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to assist these
individuals in emerging from segregated living into mainstream
society.58  Moreover, Congress concluded that such legislation must
contain clear and consistent enforcement standards that will address
discrimination against the disabled. 59  From these determinations, the
ADA was created.
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act
After extensive studies, three years of debate, and numerous hearings,
Congress passed the ADA.6° The statute is intended to eradicate
discrimination against individuals with disabilities on a national level,
55. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West 1999). In the opening provisions of the ADA, Congress
found that, even though § 504 had been the law for seventeen years, "society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities, and despite some improvements, such forms of dis-
crimination ... continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." Cook, supra note 26, at
416 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994)).
56. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 329; S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 18 (1989).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 40.
58. See id. at 50; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 20. Both Houses concluded that:
[T]here is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and for the
integration of persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life. Further, there is a need to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
S. REP. No. 101-116, at20.
59. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 20; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 50. Indeed, Congress
specifically observed that "[o]ver the last 20 years, civil rights laws protecting disabled persons
have been enacted in piecemeal fashion. Thus, existing Federal laws are like a patchwork quilt in
need of repair." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 48.
60. See Cook, supra note 26, at 414.
After all the excitement over the ... Americans with Disabilities Act ... after all the
letters and telegrams were sent from the grass-roots disability population ... after
eleven public hearings were held by the House of Representatives and three by the
Senate, after sixty-three public forums... after lengthy floor debates in the Senate and
in the House of Representatives... the disability community paused for well-deserved
self-congratulations and celebrations over this legislative accomplishment.
Id. at 393-94.
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in both the public and private sectors.61 Indeed, the ADA is the
government's most "extensive endeavor to address discrimination"
against disabled individuals.62  Importantly, it is the first statute in
United States history to declare that segregation and institutionalization
of disabled individuals are two distinct forms of discrimination. 63
Congressional findings are listed in the opening provisions of the
ADA, each of which speaks directly to the isolation of disabled
individuals from the community settings that the non-disabled generally
take for granted.64 Within these findings, Congress recognized the
historical discrimination of individuals with disabilities, including the
isolation and segregation that disabled individuals have experienced.65
Moreover, Congress recognized that, despite efforts to eradicate
discrimination against the disabled, such treatment against this group,
including institutionalization, continued. 66
Title II of the ADA applies to "public services" furnished by
governmental entities 67 and sets forth generally applicable provisions
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) (1994). The ADA intends to "provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties ... ." Id. "The ADA is a comprehensive piece of civil rights legislation which promises a
new future: a future of inclusion and integration, and the end of exclusions and segregation."
H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. HI, at 26. Other purposes of the ADA include:
[T]o provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities; to ensure that the Federal Government plays a
central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individu-
als with disabilities; and to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to ad-
dress the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)-(4).
62. Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2181 n.1 (1999), affirning in part and vacating in part
138 F.3d 893 (llth Cir. 1998).
63. See id.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l)-(9). For example, Congress explicitly noted within the find-
ings that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities
and ... discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue[s] to be a serious and perva-
sive social problem ... ." Id. § 12101(a)(2). Moreover, Congress stated that "discrimination
against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as ... institutionalization .... "
Id. § 12101(a)(3). The congressional findings also explain that "individuals with disabilities con-
tinually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion..."
and that disabled individuals, "as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are se-
verely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally .... " Id. §
12101(a)(5)-(6). Additionally, Congress noted that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete
and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subject to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment .. " Id. § 12101(a)(7).
65. See id. § 12101(a)(2); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (summarizing the
congressional findings within Title 11 of the ADA).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), (5); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165.
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that apply to any "public entity." 68 The basic anti-discrimination rule of
Title II states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 69
As remedies for a violation of Title II's prohibition of discrimination,
Congress referred to the rights, procedures, and remedies generally
available for individuals alleging discrimination under § 504.70
Moreover, Congress specifically entrusted the Attorney General with
the authority and responsibility to promulgate the regulations necessary
to further define and implement the anti-discrimination mandate of Title
11.71 Congress additionally required that the Attorney General's
regulations be consistent with the coordination regulations applicable
under § 504.72 Accordingly, the Attorney General largely patterned
Title II's regulations after the regulations set forth in § 504.73 Because
68. See id. §§ 12131-12134. A public entity includes state and local governments as a whole
and particular departments or agencies of these governments. See id. § 1213 1(1). Title I of the
ADA applies to discrimination in employment settings. See id. §§ 12111-12117. Title III bans
discrimination in public accommodations. See id. §§ 12181-12189. Because Olmstead deals
primarily with Title II of the ADA, the discussion here will focus only on this section.
69. Id. § 12132. The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 12102(2). A "qualified
individual with a disability" means "an individual with a disability who, with or without reason-
able modifications ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." Id. § 12131(2). To show a
violation of § 12132, an individual must demonstrate that: (1) he or she is a qualified individual
with a disability; (2) that he or she was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of,
some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against; and
(3) such discrimination was due to his or her disability. See Concerned Parents to Save Dreher
Park Ctr. v. City of West Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp. 986, 990 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
70. See42U.S.C.§ 12133.
71. See id. § 12134(a). Because Title H does not identify all the forms of discrimination that
the section is intended to prohibit, the Attorney General's regulations necessarily set forth the
forms of prohibited conduct. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 475. Congress intended that the regulations under Title H incorporate inter-
pretations of the term discrimination set forth in Titles I and III of the ADA to the extent that they
do not conflict with the coordination regulations promulgated under § 504. See id.
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b). The Attorney General's regulations are to be consistent with §
504 with the exception of program accessibility, existing facilities, and communications issues.
See id. One of § 504's regulations requires all recipients of federal funds to "administer programs
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped per-
sons." 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (1999). Moreover, because the ADA regulations were to be pat-
terned after the § 504 regulations, § 504 regulations remain controlling law. See Helen L. v. Di-
Dario, 46 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 1995). This is supported by the legislative history of the ADA,
which illustrates that Congress endorsed the coordination regulations of § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 44 (1989).
73. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 331.
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Congress directed the Attorney General to give meaning to Title II's
broad prohibition on discrimination in public services, the regulations
are entitled to substantial deference and are "given controlling weight,"
unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."74
The Attorney General's regulations require integrated services for the
disabled and modifications of existing programs to cater to disabled
individuals. 75 One regulation states, "[a] public entity shall administer
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities. ''76
The Department of Justice interpreted this as requiring community-
based placement of institutionalized individuals when the state's own
professionals have recommended such a placement.77  Another
regulation requires public entities to make reasonable modifications to
existing programs in order to avoid discrimination, unless such
modifications "would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity. '"78 Such "fundamental alteration" of a state's
programs or activities for the disabled may arise as a defense when the
cost to the state for providing the service or modification in services is
substantial, thereby threatening the ability of the state to provide other
services to individuals with disabilities.79
D. Helen L. v. DiDario
One of the first cases to address the effect of the ADA and its
integration regulation with respect to a state government's treatment of
disabled patients was Helen L. v. DiDario.80  In Helen L., a forty-three
74. Id. at 331-32 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
75. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (1999) (outlining requirements of public entities for pro-
viding equal opportunities and services to qualified individuals with disabilities).
76. Id. § 35.130(d). This regulation is referred to as the "integration regulation." See OIm-
stead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2177 (1999), affirming in part and vacating in part 138 F.3d 893
(1 th Cir. 1998). The Attorney General has consistently interpreted "the most integrated setting
appropriate" to be "a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-
disabled persons to the fullest extent possible." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 487.
77. See Susanne Brackley, U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Case Regarding Treatment of
Mentally Disabled, 5 N.Y. HEALTH L. UPDATE 3, 3 (1999).
78. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). This will be referred to as the "fundamental alterations" de-
fense.
79. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir. 1995); see also infra Part III.B.I-
2 (discussing the fundamental alterations defense in the lower courts' opinions in Olmstead); in-
fra Part lII.C.l.b (explaining the Supreme Court's construction of the fundamental alterations
defense in Olmstead).
80. Helen L. v. DiDario., 46 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir. 1995).
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year old mother contracted meningitis, became disabled, and, as a
result, resided at the Philadelphia Nursing Home. 8 1  The State's
treatment professionals evaluated the plaintiff and determined that she
was eligible for home-based services. 82 Because of a lack of funding,
however, the plaintiff was placed on a waiting list for home-based
services and remained in the nursing home.83  The plaintiff then filed
suit in federal court against the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare ("DPW"), alleging that her unnecessary confinement to the
nursing home violated the integration regulation of Title II of the
ADA. 84
The district court held that the DPW denied the plaintiff attendant
care services because it lacked the funds, not because the plaintiff had a
disability. 85 The court noted that the record failed to demonstrate that
the plaintiff had been denied the requested services because of her
disability. 86
After reviewing the congressional findings, the legislative history and
the Department of Justice's regulations and interpretations of the ADA,
the Third Circuit concluded that the regulations of the ADA clearly
included acts of unnecessary segregation in Title II's definition of
discrimination against the disabled. 87 In doing so, the court rejected the
DPW's argument that in order for the plaintiff to establish a claim under
Title II, she must prove that she had been discriminated against by
receiving disparate treatment as compared to her non-disabled
counterparts. 88
81. See id. at 328. Because the Philadelphia Nursing Home was a public entity that provided
services to the disabled community, it was required to comply with the requirements of Title 1I of
the ADA. See id. at 339.
82. See id. at 329.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 328.
85. See id. at 329.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 333. The court observed that the regulations promulgated under the ADA were
patterned after the coordination regulations of § 504 and that the § 504 regulations have the force
of law because the ADA extends § 504's anti-discrimination principles to public entities. See id.
at 332. Moreover, the legislative history of the ADA illustrates that Congress agreed with the
coordination regulations promulgated under § 504 and that the prohibition on discrimination on
the basis of disability set out in the regulations for § 504 is applicable to all programs and activi-
ties under Title II of the ADA. See id.
88. See id. at 335-36. The court explained that "[i]f Congress [in creating the ADA] were only
concerned about disparate treatment of the disabled as compared to their nondisabled counter-
parts," Congress' statement that "'discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as ... institutionalization"' would be "a non-sequitur, as only disabled people
are institutionalized." Id. at 336 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(3) (1994)).
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The court then addressed the DPW's assertion that although home-
based treatment was the most integrated setting appropriate for the
plaintiff, it could not provide this setting because doing so would
"fundamentally alter" the program's services. 89 The court rejected the
DPW's "fundamental alterations" defense and observed that providing
integrated services is essential to accomplishing the purposes of both
§ 504 and Title II of the ADA. 90 The court noted that the goal of the
ADA is to create a community in which the disabled participate and that
"separate-but-equal" services do not accomplish the goal.91 Moreover,
even though providing segregated services to the disabled may cost less
and be easier to administer, such segregation is not justifiable under
either § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA.92
Finally, the court held that because the State of Pennsylvania chose to
provide services to the plaintiff under the ADA, it must do so in a
manner that comports with the requirements of the ADA.93 The court
concluded that Pennsylvania's unnecessary confinement of the plaintiff
to a nursing home, instead of providing home-based services, violated
Title II of the ADA.94
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Helen L.95 It did, however,
grant certiorari and decide the similar case of Olmstead v. L. C., which
addressed whether Title II of the ADA requires states to place disabled
individuals in community-based settings when such programs would
provide more appropriate treatment than the traditional segregated
institutionalization. 96
89. See id. at 337.
90. See id. at 338-39.
91. See id. The goal of the ADA is to "eradicate the 'invisibility of the handicapped' sepa-
rate-but-equal services do not accomplish this central goal and should be rejected." Id. (citing
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473 (quoting
ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1187 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989))).
92. See id. "'The fact that it is more convenient, either administratively or fiscally, to provide
services in a segregated manner, does not constitute a valid justification for separate or different
services under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or under [Title II of the ADA].' Id. (quot-
ing testimony from the H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. IIn, at 50).
93. See id. at 339.
94. See id. at 327.
95. See id. at 339; Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare v. Idell S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
96. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999), affirming in part and vacating in part 138
F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1998); Brackley, supra note 77, at 3.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. The Facts
L.C., a mentally retarded woman who had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia,97 filed an action to challenge her continued confinement
at the Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta ("GRH-A"), a state mental
institution. 98 L.C. was hospitalized for mental illness, but her
psychiatric symptoms had been stabilized since 1993 when her doctors
determined that she could appropriately be treated in a community,
residential setting. 99 The State of Georgia, however, refused to transfer
L.C. to the appropriate community-based treatment setting.
Soon after L.C. filed her claim, the court granted the motion of E.W.
to intervene as plaintiff.1°° E.W. was a mentally retarded in-patient at
GRH-A, who had been diagnosed with a variety of psychiatric
disorders.' 0 ' E.W.'s team of psychiatric professionals also had
determined that she qualified for community-based treatment and that
the GRH-A did not meet her needs. 10 2  Again, the State of Georgia
refused to provide E.W. with community-based treatment.
Both plaintiffs alleged that the State had unnecessarily confined them
to a hospital rather than placing them in an integrated community-based
setting and that this constituted unlawful discrimination under Title II of
the ADA. 0 3 As such, the plaintiffs sought to be released from GRH-A
and to receive community-based treatment from qualified
professionals. 104
97. See L.C. v. Olmstead, 1997 WL 148674, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1997), aff'd, 138 F.3d
893 (11 th Cir. 1998), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999). L.C. has lived
more than half of her life, since the age of 14, in Georgia state institutions. See Brief for Respon-
dents in Olmstead v. L.C., 1999 WL 144128 at *7, 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536). At the
time she filed her initial complaint, L.C. had been confined for three years in GHR-A, a locked
state psychiatric hospital, with more than 60 other persons, most of whom are in acute psychiatric
crisis. See id.
98. See L. C., 1997 WL 148674, at * 1. Plaintiff named as defendants the Commissioner of the
Georgia Department of Human Resources, the Superintendent of GRH-A, and the Executive Di-
rector of the Fulton County Regional Board, which is the body responsible for providing mental
health and mental retardation services in Fulton County (collectively "the State"). See id.
99. See id.; see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *6.
100. SeeL.C., 1997WL148674,at*1.
101. See id.
102. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *7. The professional staff "knew that E.W.
did not need to be institutionalized to receive appropriate treatment." Id. In 1995, a staff psy-
chologist recommended that E.W. be placed in another environment so that she could "climb out
of her depression" and determined that the community was an appropriate setting for her. Id.
103. See L.C., 1997WL 148674, at*1.
104. See id.
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B. The Lower Court Decisions in Olmstead v. L. C.
1. The District Court
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered that
each be placed in a community-based treatment setting. 10 5  The court
rejected the State's argument that the plaintiffs had been retained at
GRH-A due to a lack of funding for community placement and not "by
reason of' their disabilities. 106 It concluded that the unnecessary
institutional segregation of the plaintiffs and the failure to place them in
the appropriate treatment program constituted a violation of Title II of
the ADA, "which cannot be justified by a lack of funding."' 10 7
To support these conclusions, the court considered the language and
the legislative history of the ADA, which specifically states that
"segregation" is a "form of discrimination" under the ADA "that
Congress intended to eliminate." 10 8  The court also considered the
Attorney General's regulations for Title II of the ADA and noted that
the integration regulation plainly prohibited unnecessary institutional
segregation. 1°9 The court then concluded that the state's unnecessary
confinement of the plaintiffs constituted discrimination. 110
105. See id. at *4. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' claims were moot because the
State placed L.C. into a community-based setting during this court proceeding. See id. at *2.
L.C., however, claimed that she was not receiving "the services intended to be" rendered to her
and due to her history of repeated institutional hospitalizations over the past years, the court
found that a significant threat existed that L.C. would again be placed in GRH-A. Id. Therefore,
both the trial court and appellate court explicitly stated that the questions presented to the court
were "not moot because they are 'capable of repetition, yet evading review."' Id. (quoting
Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1498 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1994)). Moreover, E.W. remained con-
fined in GRH-A, which the defendants claimed resulted from a lack of funding. See id. The
court rejected this argument and, therefore, held that her claim also was not moot. See id. at *3.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants failed to provide them with appropriate treatment, "ha-
bilitation and freedom from undue restraint," which violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Id. at *2. The court rendered moot the plaintiffs' claims that their
unnecessary institutionalization violated the Due Process Clause as a result of its grant of sum-
mary judgment to the plaintiffs on the ADA claim. See id. at *4-5.
106. See id. at *3.
107. Id.
108. Id. The court considered the specific congressional findings located within the opening
provisions of Title II of the ADA. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (1994);
supra Part II.C (discussing Title II of the ADA and its prohibitions on discrimination). The court
also cited the testimony of Senator Harkin, floor manager of the ADA in the Senate, who stated
that the statute "guarantees individuals with disabilities the right to be integrated into the eco-
nomic and social mainstream of society; segregation and isolation by others will no longer be tol-
erated." L.C., 1997 WL 148674, at *3 n.2 (citing 135 CONG. REC. 19803 (1989)).
109. See L.C., 1997 WL 148674, at *3 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1997)).
110. See id. The court did not address whether such discrinination of the plaintiffs was "by
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The court also rejected the State's reliance on the fundamental
alterations defense."' Specifically, the State argued that requiring the
immediate transfer of the plaintiffs to community-based treatment
centers would result in an increase in cost to the State and, thus, would
constitute a fundamental alteration of the services the State provided to
individuals with disabilities. 1 2  The court, however, concluded that the
defendants had failed to show that providing community-based services
to the plaintiffs would result in a fundamental alteration of the services
that the State provided. 1 3 The court rejected the notion that the State
may rely on a "cost based" defense when faced with a claim under Title
II of the ADA.' 14 The court ordered the State to comply with the ADA
by providing all of the necessary services to L.C. and E.W. 15
2. The Court of Appeals
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
finding that the State had violated the ADA's integration requirement
by confining the plaintiffs in a segregated institution instead of treating
"them in an integrated community-based program." 1 6 The Eleventh
Circuit, however, disagreed with the trial court's complete rejection of
the fundamental alterations defense for states. 117  Consequently, the
Court of Appeals remanded the "case to the district court for further
findings related to the State's defense" that the cost of relief sought by
L.C. and E.W. would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program or activity."' 11
8
reason of ... disability." Id. According to the court, however, its conclusion that the unneces-
sary confinement of the plaintiffs in GRH-A constitutes discrimination under the ADA rendered
the State's argument that the treatment was not "by reason of ... disability" irrelevant. Id. at *3-
4.
111. See id. at *4; see also supra Part HI.C (discussing the fundamental alterations defense).
112. See L.C., 1997 WL 148674, at *4.
113. See id. To support this finding, the court cited Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir.
1995), and similarly observed that the State not only had existing programs to provide services
within the community but that these community-based services also cost less than the institutional
settings in which the plaintiffs had lived. See id. The trial record showed that "on an annual ba-
sis, institutional care for the mentally disabled costs more than twice as much as community
care." Id. at *4 n.4.
114. See id. at *4. The court considered the ADA's legislative history, and found that "[the
fact that it may be more convenient, either administratively or fiscally, to provide services in a
segregated manner does not justify defendants' failure to comply with the ADA." Id.
115. See id. The court ordered the State to maintain L.C.'s placement in a community-based
setting and required the State to place E.W. into a community-based setting. See id.
116. L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895 (11th Cir. 1998), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
117. See id.
118. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1997)). On remand, the district court rejected the
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On appeal, the State argued that the ADA was designed to prevent
states from denying individuals with disabilities the services and
opportunities offered to healthy, non-disabled individuals, and that the
ADA did not apply to the present situation because the services at issue
were available only to disabled individuals. 119 The Eleventh Circuit
found this argument specious and emphasized that both the plain
language and the legislative intent of the ADA provide proof that
Congress sought to eliminate the segregation of disabled individuals
from the community at large.120 The court further noted that Congress
explicitly considered the provision of segregated services to the disabled
a form of discrimination prohibited by the ADA.
121
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the State's argument that the
State denied the plaintiffs community treatment because it lacked the
funds and not "by reason" of their disabilities. 122  Consequently, the
court held that the plaintiffs' claims should not fail. 123  The court
explained, "the absence of malevolent motive does not convert a
facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy."' 124 The Eleventh
State's fundamental alterations defense. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2185 n.7 (1999),
affirming in part and vacating in part 138 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1998). "The court concluded that
the annual cost to the State of providing community-based treatment to L.C. and E.W. was not
unreasonable in relation to the State's overall mental health budget." Id.
119. See L.C., 138 F.3d at 896.
120. See id. The court noted:
The ADA does not only mandate that individuals with disabilities be treated the same
as persons without such disabilities. Underlying the ADA's prohibitions is the notion
that individuals with disabilities must be accorded reasonable accommodations not of-
fered to other persons in order to ensure that individuals with disabilities enjoy "equal-
ity of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency."
Id. at 899 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994)); see also Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d
282, 285 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (describing the basic purpose of the ADA as "ensuring that those with
disabilities can fully participate in all aspects of society")). The court then adopted the Third Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Helen L. v. DiDario: "'[I]f Congress were only concerned about disparate
treatment of the disabled as compared to their non-disabled counterparts,' then Congress' state-
ment that 'discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such areas as ... institu-
tionalization' would be a non sequitur as only disabled persons are institutionalized." Id. at 901
(quoting Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 336 (3d Cir. 1995)).
121. See id. at 898. Specifically, the court stated, "[c]ertainly, the denial of community based
placements to individuals with disabilities such as L.C. and E.W. is precisely the kind of segrega-
tion that Congress sought to eliminate." Id.
122. See id. at 902.
123. See id.
124. Id. (comparing Title II of the ADA to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and quoting Inter-
national Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991)). The court explained that
even if the State had failed to place L.C. and E.W. into community-based treatment because it
lacked funds to do so, "this motive does not lessen the 'discriminatory character' of their segre-
gation." Id.
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Circuit, however, recognized that a state has a defense to its duty to
provide services to a disabled individual in the most integrated setting
appropriate. 125  Title II regulations require states to make reasonable
modifications but not to make fundamental alterations. 126  The court
interpreted the fundamental alterations defense to allow a cost-based
rationale "only in the most limited of circumstances."' 27  It noted that
such a defense would necessarily fail unless the state can prove that
requiring it to expend additional funding to provide a disabled
individual with the most integrated setting appropriate "would be so
unreasonable given the demands of the State's mental health budget that
it would fundamentally alter the service it provide[d].' 28
C. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
In a 6-3 decision, the majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg,
affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that unjustified isolation of
disabled individuals constitutes discrimination under Title II of the
ADA. 129  The majority, however, recognized the States' need to
maintain a large range of facilities for the treatment of a variety of
mentally disabled individuals and "the State's obligation to administer
125. See id. at 903.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 902; see also Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2188 (1999), affirming in part and
vacating in part 138 F.3d 893 (1 lth Cir. 1998) (describing the Eleventh Circuit's construction of
the fundamental alterations defense).
128. L.C., 138 F.3d at 905. The court of appeals remanded the case because it appeared that
the trial court "had entirely ruled out a 'lack of funding' justification." Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at
2184. The appellate court instructed the district court to consider the following factors when de-
termining if the State had met its burden of establishing a "fundamental alterations" defense:
(1) whether the additional expenditures necessary to treat L.C. and E.W. in commu-
nity-based care would be unreasonable given the demands of the State's mental health
budget; (2) whether it would be unreasonable to require the State to use additional
available Medicaid waiver slots, as well as its authority under Georgia law to transfer
funds from institutionalized care to community-based care, to minimize any financial
burden on the State; and (3) whether any difference in the cost of providing institu-
tional or community-based care will lessen the State's financial burden.
L.C., 138 F.3d at 905.
129. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181. The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsberg,
was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Kennedy, and Breyer. See id. at 2179-80.
Justice Stevens, however, did not agree with the majority's construction of the fundamental al-
terations defense and wrote a concurring opinion on this issue. See id. at 2190 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. See id.
at 2190-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The dissent, written by Justice Thomas, was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. See id. at 2194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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services with an even hand."' 130  Accordingly, the majority concluded
that the Eleventh Circuit's evaluation of the fundamental alterations
defense unduly restricted the states. 13 1 The Court further stated that in
evaluating such a defense, a court must consider, in view of all the
resources available to a state, "the cost of providing community-based
care to the" disabled individual, the range of services provided to others
with mental disabilities, and the state's obligation to deliver those
services in an equal fashion.
132
a. Unnecessary Institutionalization Is Discrimination Under the ADA
The majority held that undue institutionalization qualifies as
discrimination "by reason of ... disability."' 133  In so holding, the
majority particularly rejected the State's argument that the State did not
discriminate against L.C. and E.W. within the meaning of the ADA
because it did not deny them community placement "by reason of' their
disabilities. 134  To support this conclusion, the majority considered the
amicus brief filed by the Department of Justice, in which the
Department advocated that unnecessary institutionalization is
discrimination within the meaning of both § 504 and Title II of the
ADA. 135 The Court noted that it defered to the views of the Department
of Justice and that courts may resort to the Department's views for
guidance. 1
36
Moreover, the Court rejected the State's argument that discrimination
requires the unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals in a
different statutorily described class and that plaintiffs did not identify
such a comparison class of individuals who were given preferential
treatment. 137 According to the majority, Congress intended the ADA's
130. Id. at 2185.
131. See id.
132. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration of the appropriate
relief for the plaintiff, given the range of facilities the defendant maintains "for the care and
treatment of persons with diverse mental disabilities, and the [state's] obligation [to] administer
services with an even hand." Id.
133. Id. at 2185.
134. See id. at 2186.
135. See id. at 2185-86 n.9. The majority cited to a number of briefs for the United States in
which the Department of Justice stated that institutionalization without a permissible reason vio-
lates Title I of the ADA and § 504 if the institutionalization is supported by federal funds. See
id. at 2186 n.9.
136. See id. at 2186 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)).
137. See id.; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and the concept of disparate treatment).
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definition of discrimination to be more comprehensive. 138 Even so, the
majority illustrated that when the State's definition of discrimination
was applied to the plaintiffs' case, discrimination under Title II of the
ADA existed. 1
39
To illustrate that Congress intended the definition of discrimination
to extend beyond the traditional definition, the majority considered
earlier statutory measures taken to protect individuals with disabilities
from discriminatory treatment, each of which enhanced the earlier
measures used to secure the disabled an opportunity to enjoy the
benefits of community living. 140 The Court began with the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
("DDABRA"), which provided in hortatory terms that states should
provide an individual with developmental disabilities the least
restrictive setting for that individual's personal liberty. 14 1 Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act expanded to "mandatory language to proscribe
discrimination against people with disabilities" when it stated, "[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ...
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, or denied the benefits of, or be subjected to the
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 142 The majority then considered the congressional findings
within Title II of the ADA and concluded that ultimately, when
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, Congress required all public
entities to refrain from discrimination. 143 Moreover, Congress explicitly
stated within the statute that "unjustified 'segregation' of persons with
disabilities" is a form of discrimination. 144 As such, the majority found
138. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2186. The Court noted that "[tihe dissent is driven by the
notion that 'this Court has never endorsed an interpretation of the word 'discrimination' that en-
compassed disparate treatment among members of the same protected class."' Id. at 2186 n.10
(quoting Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion). The majority, however, refuted the dissent's ar-
gument by citing cases in which the Court endorsed a definition of discrimination that involved a
member of a particular protected group who "has been favored over another member of that same
group." Id. at 2186 n.10 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76
(1998); O'Conner v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996); Jefferies v.
Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (1980)).
139. See id. at 2187.
140. See id. at2186-87.
141. See id. at 2186.
142. Id. at 2186-87 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)).
143. See id. at 2187.
144. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2) (1994), which states the congressional findings of
the ADA). The majority also cited to § 12101(a)(3) and (5), each of which refers to institutionali-
zation as a form of discrimination against people with disabilities. See id.
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that unjustified institutional isolation of individuals with disabilities
clearly constituted discrimination under the ADA.
145
The majority also found that unnecessary institutionalization of
individuals with disabilities results in dissimilar treatment of such
individuals vis-A-vis a different group. 146 Specifically, the Court
determined that dissimilar treatment of mentally disabled individuals
occurs when the individual who qualifies for community placement is
unjustly institutionalized because he or she must, as a result of his or her
disability, give up participation in community life in order to receive
needed medical assistance and services. 147 The Court considered this
dissimilar treatment of the institutionalized disabled individuals in
comparison to those without mental disabilities who do not have to
relinquish participation in community life to receive medical
services. 148
The Court emphasized that nothing in the ADA requires or even
allows the transfer of a disabled individual from an institutional setting
to a community-based setting if he or she does not qualify for the
transfer. 149  The majority also observed that a state "may rely on the
reasonable assessments of its own" treatment professionals to determine
whether the disabled individual "meets the essential eligibility
requirements" to live in a community-based setting. 150  If the
professionals determine that the individual does not qualify for the
community-based treatment, the state has no obligation to make such a
transfer. 151  Finally, the Court made clear that even if the state's
treatment professionals determine that an individual is qualified for
community-based treatment, the state may not impose community
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. The Court further explained that dissimilar treatment of a disabled individual also
occurs when an individual is unnecessarily institutionalized because such confinement perpetu-
ates the unwarranted assumptions that the individual is incapable of participation in community
life. See id. Moreover, this unnecessary confinement diminishes the everyday life activities of
the disabled, such as social life, family relations, ability to receive a higher education, and ability
to be economically independent. See id.
149. See id. The Court stated that "[a]bsent such qualification, it would be inappropriate to
remove a patient from the more restrictive setting." Id. at 2188.
150. Id. "Courts normally should defer to the reasonable judgments of public health offi-
cials." Id. (quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)).
151. See id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998), containing the ADA regulations promul-
gated by the Attorney General).
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treatment on the individual if that individual does not desire such a
transfer. 152
b. The State's Fundamental Alterations Defense
Despite the fact that unnecessary institutionalization constitutes
discrimination under the ADA, the Court noted that the State's
obligation to transfer a disabled individual to a community-based setting
is not absolute. 153  The State may decline to place the qualified
individual in a community-based setting if the transfer would "entail a
'fundamental alteration' of the State's services and programs."'154  The
Court construed the fundamental alterations defense to allow a state to
show that, in allocating its resources, immediate placement for the
disabled individual would be inequitable, given the responsibility of a
state to care for and provide services to a large number of disabled
individuals. 155
By construing the fundamental alterations defense in this way, the
Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation that the defense is
available to the states only in very limited circumstances. 156 The Court
stated that the Eleventh Circuit's construction of the defense would
"leave the State virtually defenseless" because it is unlikely that states
could ever prevail if the cost of placing one or two mentally disabled
individuals into community treatment is measured for reasonableness
against the state's entire mental health budget. 157  Moreover, the Court
noted that under its interpretation of the "fundamental alterations"
152. See id. "Nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability
to accept an accommodation ... which such individual chooses not to accept." Id. (quoting 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1)).
153. See id.
154. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).
155. See id.
156. See id. (citing L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d. 893, 902 (1 1th Cir. 1998)). The majority's
interpretation of the fundamental alterations defense grants the State more "leeway than the courts
below understood the.., defense to allow." Id. at 2189. According to the Court, this "leeway" is
necessary because the state provides for a wide variety of disabled individuals with changing
needs. See id. For example, some individuals with disabilities may qualify for community-based
treatment, and then later require the more restrictive environment of an institution. See id. There-
fore, the state cannot simply close institutions as its residents are placed into community-based
treatment settings. See id. The Court specifically noted that if a state can show that it had devel-
oped a comprehensive treatment plan for an institutionalized disabled individual to be placed in a
community setting, which was not based on the state's desire to keep up the population of resi-
dents within the institution, the reasonable modifications standard would be satisfied. See id.
Therefore, the state would not have committed discrimination "by reason of disability" by re-
quiring the individual to wait a short period of time for a community-based placement to open up.
Id. at 2190.
157. Id. at 2188.
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defense, a state may prevail by showing that the state has incurred
additional expenses as a result of funding community placements while
not being able to save funds by closing institutions. 
158
In conclusion, the majority held that under Title II of the ADA, a
state is required to place an institutionalized disabled individual into a
community-based setting when the state's treatment professionals have
determined that the community-based setting is appropriate for the
disabled individual, and the disabled individual does not oppose the
community-based treatment setting. 159 The state, however, is mandated
to place the individual in community-based treatment only when it can
provide the transfer through reasonable accommodations, taking into
account the resources available to the state and the needs of other
individuals with mental disabilities.
160
2. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that a state's decision to
exclude temporarily an individual from community placement does not
amount to discrimination in the traditional sense of the word.
16 1
According to the dissent, the majority interpreted the term
discrimination erroneously by encompassing disparate treatment of
members of the same class while discrimination actually requires a
showing that the "claimant received differential treatment vis-a-vis
members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily described
characteristic." 162 Moreover, Justice Thomas noted that the majority's
conclusion will impose significant federalism costs by instructing the
states on how to deliver public services. 163 The dissent explained that
the fundamental alterations defense will be of little assistance to states
who will be subject to law suits every time the state is financially unable
to immediately place a qualified disabled individual in a community-
based setting. 164
a. The Majority's Erroneous Definition of Discrimination
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that unnecessary
158. See id. at 2184.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 2194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 2198 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 2199 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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institutionalization constitutes discrimination under Title II of the
ADA. 165  According to the dissent, temporary exclusion from
community-based treatment does not amount to discrimination, nor had
the respondents proven that the State discriminated against them by
reason of their disabilities. 166
First, the dissent accused the majority of endorsing an interpretation
of the word discrimination that improperly encompasses disparate
treatment of members of the same protected class. 167  In finding the
majority's interpretation to be inaccurate, the dissent relied on the
dictionary definition of discrimination, the plain language of the ADA
and § 504 and court decisions construing the various statutory
prohibitions of discrimination. 168 The dissent found that the common
understanding of discrimination requires a showing that the individual
received unequal treatment vis-A-vis members of a similarly situated
group based on a characteristic that is statutorily described. 169
In support of this conclusion, Justice Thomas considered Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 504 in an attempt to show that the
various statutory prohibitions against discrimination have endorsed the
dissent's definition of discrimination. 170  Under Title VII, which bans
employment discrimination, it is illegal for an employer to discriminate
against a person "with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 17' The Supreme Court has
construed the purpose of Title VII as "to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees."' 172  According to the dissent, then, a finding of
discrimination must involve a comparison of "otherwise similarly
165. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 2194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 2194-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas quotes the dictionary defini-
tion of "discrimination" as support for the traditional definition of the word discrimination. Dis-
crimination is defined as "to 'distinguish,' to 'differentiate,' or to make a 'distinction in favor or
against, a person or a thing based on the group, class, or category to which that person or thing
belongs rather than on individual merit."' Id. at 2194 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY 564 (2d ed. 1987)).
169. See id. at 2194 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text
(discussing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the concept of disparate treatment).
170. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2194-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2195 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971)).
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situated persons who are in different groups by reason of certain
characteristics provided by statute." 173  To the dissent, a finding of
discrimination under the ADA involves the comparison of the mentally
disabled plaintiffs with their non-disabled counterparts and not simply a
comparison of the plaintiffs with other mentally disabled individuals.
The dissent then analyzed § 504 and concluded that it too applied the
commonly understood meaning of discrimination. 174 The dissent found
that under § 504, courts have limited the application of the term
discrimination to a member of a protected class who has faced
discrimination based on a handicap. 175  According to the dissent, the
Court has ruled that § 504 requires only that states treat individuals with
disabilities similarly to those without disabilities. 176
173. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Courts have interpreted Title VII to disallow a plaintiff to
prove "'discrimination' by demonstrating that one member of a particular protected group has
been favored over another member of that same group." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). To the
dissent, if such a claim were allowed, discrimination could be found "where a black employee
with deficient management skills is denied in-house training by his employer (allegedly because
of a lack of funding) because other similarly situated black employees are given the in-house
training." Id. at 2198 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 2195-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
175. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
176. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). "[W]e found that § 504 required merely 'the even-
handed treatment of handicapped persons' relative to those persons who do not have disabilities."
Id. at 2196 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 410 (1979)). To further support its definition of discrimination, the dissent cited case law
construing § 504. See id. at 2196 (Thomas, J., dissenting). First, in Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985), the Court previously found no discrimination within a benefits policy that lim-
ited in-patient hospital care and that "did not 'distinguish between those whose coverage will be
reduced and those whose coverage will not be on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait that the
handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting or less likely of having."' Olmstead, 119 S.
Ct. at 2196 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 302). In Alexander, the Su-
preme Court concluded that under § 504, there is no guarantee that a State will provide one
handicapped individual with equal Medicaid benefits to those of other handicapped individuals
who also receive such benefits. See id (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the holding in Alex-
ander). The dissent in Olmstead used Alexander to illustrate that § 504 does not guarantee equal
treatment among individuals within the same statutory class-the guarantee that the dissent ac-
cuses the majority of adopting. See id. at 2196 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent also cited
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988), in which the Court stated that "the purpose of § 504 is
to guarantee that individuals with disabilities receive 'evenhanded treatment' relative to those
persons without disabilities." Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2196 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Traynor,
the Court upheld a regulation that provided a benefit to alcoholics with a mental disorder but ex-
cluded "primary alcoholics" from receiving the benefit. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Traynor, 485 U.S. at 551). The Court noted that the regulation did "not involve a program or ac-
tivity that is alleged to treat handicapped persons less favorably than nonhandicapped persons."
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In this case, the Court stated that nothing within § 504 requires that
an extension of a benefit "'to one category of handicapped people also be extended to all other
categories of handicapped persons."' Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting the holding in
Traynor).
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Next, the dissent argued that the majority's reliance on vague
congressional findings within the ADA to conclude that unnecessary
institutionalization constitutes discrimination under Title II does not
show that Congress sought to alter the commonly understood definition
of discrimination endorsed by the dissent. 177 According to the dissent,
the congressional findings, which label institutional isolation as
segregation and include this as a discriminatory practice, are meant to
be used in a general sense and pertain only to matters such as access to
employment, facilities, and transportation. 178  Because there is no
explicit definition of these terms within the statute, the dissent urged
that the term discrimination should be defined using its common
meaning. 179
Last, the dissent used statutory construction to support its definition
of discrimination. 80 Title I of the ADA contains a specific definition of
discrimination to be used within that particular section of the ADA.' 8'
Under Title I, discrimination arises when a member of a protected group
is treated differently from other members of the same protected
group. 182 Title II, however, does not contain a specific definition for the
term discrimination. 183  Absent a specific definition of discrimination
for Title II of the ADA, the dissent argued that the definition used by
the majority is "a novel proposition" that is not supported by case law in
similar areas of the law. 184 Thus, the dissent concluded that the
majority's definition of discrimination is too broad and will allow
177. See id. at 2196-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Justice Thomas, "the congres-
sional findings... are written in general, hortatory terms and provide little guidance to the inter-
pretation of the specific language of § 12132." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Section 12132 de-
fines "discrimination" under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); see also supra Part
HI.C. L.a (discussing the majority's reliance on the congressional findings within the ADA).
178. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2197 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Title I, which addresses employment discrimination,
contains the following definition of discrimination: "limiting, segregating, or classifying a job
applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant
or employee." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(l)).
182. See id. at 2198 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
183. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent cites to Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16 (1983), in which the Court held that "'[w]here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."' Id. at 2197-
98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184. See id. at 2198 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent accused the majority of importing
the definition of discrimination used within Title I of the ADA into Title ii, "by necessarily as-
suming that it is sufficient to focus exclusively on members of one particular group." Id. (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting).
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discrimination of the disabled to arise every time a state treats a
disabled individual differently from another disabled individual.185
b. The Fundamental Alterations Defense
Next, the dissent briefly addressed the "fundamental alterations"
defense available to the states. 186  It concluded that the federal
government's interference with the functions of state governments
would impose significant federalism costs. 187 The dissent further noted
that the defense will provide little assistance to states that are subjected
to law suits whenever a qualified individual requests community
treatment and the state is financially unable to provide such treatment
immediately. 188 According to the dissent, the Court should have left the
states with the authority and responsibility to provide services to
individuals with disabilities. 189
3. Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's conclusion that unjustified
segregation of the disabled constitutes discrimination under the ADA. 190
According to Justice Stevens, however, the majority should have
adopted the court of appeals' construction of the "fundamental
alterations" defense. 91 To Justice Stevens, the appeals court correctly
remanded the case to the district court for determination of the
"fundamental alterations" defense. 192  On remand from the Eleventh
Circuit's decision, the district court rejected the State's defense. 193
185. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent attempts to illustrate its point with an exam-
ple using Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to the
dissent, when the majority's definition of discrimination is applied to Title VII, discrimination
could be found "where a black employee with deficient management skills is denied in-house
training by his employer (allegedly because of lack of funding) because other similarly situated
black employees are given the in-house training." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). To the dissent,
this is much too broad a definition. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. See id. at 2198 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 2199 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 2190 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
191. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). "If a plaintiff
requests relief that requires modification of a State's services or programs, the State may assert,
as an affirmative defense, that the requested modification would cause a fundamental alteration of
a State's services and programs." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
192. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
193. See id. at 2190 (Stevens J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
id. at 2185 n.7.
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Justice Stevens stated that if the district court was wrong in its
conclusion, the court of appeals or the Supreme Court, in a review of
that decision, was responsible for correcting the error.194 Therefore, the
majority should have simply affirmed the conclusion of the Eleventh
Circuit.1 95
4. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy expressed concern that the majority's holding would
result in the deinstitutionalization of mentally disabled individuals who
are not qualified for community-based treatment. 196 According to
Justice Kennedy, it would be a "tragic event" if the ADA were
interpreted so that states had an incentive to move mentally disabled
individuals out of appropriate care in institutions and into a community-
care environment that provides too little supervision and aid for
disabled individuals. 197  For this reason, Justice Kennedy agreed with
the majority's conclusion that the courts must apply the Olmstead
holding with great deference to the medical decisions of the
professionals who determine the appropriate settings for individuals
with mental disabilities. 198
194. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
195. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens
noted that because there were not five votes for his disposition of the case, he joined Justice
Ginsburg in Parts I, II and III-A of her opinion. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
196. See id. at 2191 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer joined Justice
Kennedy in his concurrence. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
[T]he depopulation of state mental hospitals has its dark side... "[ffor a substantial
minority... deinstitutionalization has been a psychiatric Titanic. Their lives are virtu-
ally devoid of 'dignity' or 'integrity of body, mind and spirit' . ... The 'least restrictive
setting' frequently turns out to be a cardboard box, a jail cell, or a terror-filled exis-
tence plagued by both real and imaginary enemies."
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
197. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). "[S]tates may be pressured into at-
tempting compliance on the cheap, placing marginal patients into integrated settings devoid of the
services and attention necessary for their condition." Id. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
198. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy is also concerned
about the federalism costs associated with "referring state decisions regarding the administration
of treatment programs [for those with mental disabilities] and the allocation of resources to the
reviewing authority of the federal courts." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). For
this reason, Justice Kennedy stated that it is of central importance that the courts apply Olmstead
"with appropriate deference to the program funding decisions of state policymakers." Id. (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy also noted that, in his opinion, a State
may not be forced to create a community treatment program where a program does not currently
exist because this would result in a fundamental alteration of the service, program, or policy. See
id. at 2193 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Kennedy also agreed with the dissent's "traditional" definition
of discrimination. 199 Unlike the dissent, however, he observed that
"'differential treatment vis-A-vis members of a different group on the
basis of a statutorily described characteristic"' could be found in L.C
and E.W.'s case.2°  If the plaintiffs could show that individuals in need
of psychiatric or other medical services to treat their disabilities are
"subject to a more onerous condition" than are other individuals who
qualify for state medical services, and if the removal of this condition
would not fundamentally alter the program or require a new program to
be established, the plaintiffs might be able to establish a discrimination
case under the ADA.20 1
Finally, Justice Kennedy stated that, unlike the dissent, he found it
relevant that Congress expressed findings that explained that
discrimination against the disabled persists in areas such as
institutionalization. 20 2  According to Justice Kennedy, however, these
findings do not show that institutionalization is always a form of
prohibited discrimination under the ADA.2 °3 Instead, the findings show
only Congress' concern that segregating the mentally disabled from
mainstream society can be discriminatory and that such discrimination
is a pervasive problem. 204 Justice Kennedy observed that these findings
are consistent with the definition endorsed by the dissent, which
requires differential treatment of different groups. 20 5 Therefore, the fact
199. See id. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
200. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 2194-95 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting)). As a result, Justice Kennedy recommended that the case be remanded for a determina-
tion of the questions the Court posed and a determination of whether L.C. and E.W. can show a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12132's ban on discrimination based on summary judgment materials or
on any materials properly allowed by the Court. See id. at 2194 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
201. Id. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Specific to the case of L.C. and
E.W., Justice Kennedy outlined what they would need to show to establish discrimination under
the ADA:
[I]f respondents could show that Georgia (i) provides treatment to individuals suffering
from medical problems of comparable seriousness, (ii) as a general matter, does so in
the most integrated setting appropriate for the treatment of those problems (taking
medical and other practical considerations into account), but (iii) without adequate jus-
tification, fails to do so for a group of mentally disabled persons (treating them instead
in separate, locked institutional facilities), I believe it would demonstrate discrimina-
tion on the basis of mental disability.
Id. at 2192-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
202. See id. at 2193 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (1994)).
203. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
204. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
205. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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that L.C. and E.W. were placed in institutions does not conclusively
show that Congress intended this confinement to be discriminatory
under the ADA.
20 6
IV. ANALYSIS
The dissent erroneously applied the "traditional" definition of
discrimination to L.C and E.W's case and overlooked the more
comprehensive definition of discrimination provided for in the ADA.2 °7
Although the ADA's definition of discrimination differs from the
"traditional" definition, which requires a showing that the claimant
received disparate treatment vis-a-vis members of a different group
based on a statutory characteristic, the majority correctly construed the
ADA's definition of discrimination as prohibiting unnecessary
institutionalization. 20 8  Moreover, while the dissent cited § 504 to
illustrate that statutory prohibitions of discrimination have only adopted
the "traditional" definition of discrimination, the dissent failed to
recognize that under § 504 courts have found unnecessary
institutionalization to be discrimination. 209
A. The ADA 's Defintion of Discrimination: No Unnecessary
Institutionalization
The majority correctly held that Title II prohibits unnecessary
institutionalization and segregation of mentally disabled individuals. 210
This conclusion is evidenced by the plain language of the ADA, the
Attorney General's consistent interpretation of the ADA as prohibiting
unnecessary institutionalization of the disabled, and the legislative
history of the ADA. 21'
206. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). "The issue whether respondents have
been discriminated against under § 12132 by institutionalized treatment cannot be decided in the
abstract, divorced from the facts surrounding treatment programs in their State." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
207. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994); see also supra note 64 and accompanying
text (summarizing the congressional findings of Title II of the ADA).
208. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting that Congress recognized institution-
alization as a form of discrimination).
209. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (citing cases decided under § 504).
210. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2190. Although the majority briefly discussed the Depart-
ment of Justice's consistent interpretation of the ADA as prohibiting unnecessary segregation and
the congressional findings within Title II, it did not use the legislative history of the ADA to sup-
port the conclusion. See id. at 2185-87. The following discussion expands on the majority's
opinion and provides further support for its conclusion that unnecessary institutionalization con-
stitutes discrimination under the ADA. See infra Part IV.A-C.
211. See infra Part IV.A.
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1. The Plain Language of the ADA
The critical language of the ADA supports the majority's conclusion
that unnecessary segregation of individuals with disabilities constitutes
discrimination. 2 12 The central anti-discriminatory rule of Title II of the
ADA provides, in part: "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability ... be subjected to discrimination by any [public] entity. 213
The dissent argued that in order for an individual to be subjected to
discrimination under this rule of the ADA, the disabled individual must
experience uneven treatment vis-a-vis similarly situated individuals in a
different group based on a statutorily described characteristic. 2 14 This
definition of discrimination, however, overlooks the specific
congressional purposes and findings contained within the ADA, each of
which expands the definition of discrimination beyond the "traditional"
definition endorsed by the dissent.2 15
The statutory context of Title II of the ADA includes a set of findings
and standards for interpretation of the statute.2 16 Within these findings,
Congress explicitly stated the meaning it intended to give the term
"discrimination" under Title II of the ADA.2 17 Among others, Congress
found that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and ... such forms of discrimination...
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 218 Congress
also found that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter
various forms of discrimination, including ... segregation, "219 and that
discrimination persists in a wide variety of contexts, including through
"institutionalization." 220 These findings show that Congress intended
the definition of discrimination to include the unjustified institutional
segregation of the disabled.2 2' Moreover, these findings illustrate that
Congress did not intend to limit discrimination under the ADA to the
212. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (summarizing the congressional findings
of Title II of the ADA).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
214. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
215. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994); see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying
text (summarizing the congressional findings of Title II of the ADA).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2); see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
220. See id. § 12101(a)(3).
221. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
54, at *12.
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uneven treatment of disabled individuals in comparison to their non-
disabled counterparts.
The dissent argued that the congressional findings relied on by the
majority are too vague to show that Congress sought to alter the
traditional definition of discrimination. 222 Congress, however, included
findings directly within the statute that show the specific discriminatory
practices that individuals with disabilities experience. 223  None of the
findings are vague; rather, they point directly to specific areas against
which individuals with disabilities are discriminated.224 Moreover,
Senator Harkin, the sponsor of the ADA, explained that the purpose of
the congressional findings was "to ensure once and for all that no
Federal agency or judge will ever misconstrue the congressional
mandate to integrate people with disabilities into the mainstream. '" 225
This illustrates that the congressional findings are not only clear but that
federal agencies and courts should rely on them when determining what
constitutes discrimination under the ADA.
2. The Attorney General's Consistent Interpretation of Title II
In addition to the congressional findings that illustrate that
unnecessary segregation constitutes discrimination under the ADA, the
Attorney General's consistent interpretation of the integration regulation
as prohibiting unnecessary institutionalization of disabled individuals
provides further support for the majority's conclusion that unnecessary
institutionalization constitutes discrimination under Title II of the
ADA.226 Following Congress' direction, the Attorney General created
the integration regulation, which mandates that states administer public
services and programs "in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
222. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2196-99 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting), affirm-
ing in part and vacating in part 138 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1998).
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5); see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). "[D]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities per-
sists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transpor-
tation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to pub-
lic services ... ." Id. Moreover, the findings explain that the goal of Title II is to "assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
such individuals .... " Id. § 12101(a)(8); see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
225. Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at 17-18 (citing 135 CONG. REC. S4986 (daily ed.
May 9, 1989)).
226. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999). Unlike Title I and Title III of the ADA, Title II does
not explain all the forms of discrimination prohibited. Instead, Congress instructed the Attorney
General to enact regulations to implement Title II and set forth the forms of discrimination pro-
hibited. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
475; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
54, at *7-8.
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needs of qualified individuals with disabilities."227 The Attorney
General has interpreted this regulation to require states, in certain
situations, to place individuals who reside in institutions into
community-based services.
228
Although the dissent argued that discrimination under Title II only
occurs when states treat disabled individuals differently from their non-
disabled counterparts, the Attorney General has not interpreted the
integration regulation to contain such a limitation.229  According to the
Attorney General, the integration regulation applies to any services of a
public entity, including services that are offered only to disabled
individuals. 230  Specifically, the Attorney General has explained that the
most "integrated setting" within the integration regulation is "a setting
that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled
persons to the fullest extent possible." 231 This interpretation provides
no requirement that the integration regulation mandate the most
integrated setting only when the individual has received uneven
treatment in comparison to his or her non-disabled counterparts.
The Attorney General has specifically refuted the argument that
discrimination requires a showing that a disabled individual has been
treated differently than a similarly situated individual in a statutorily
different group. 232  According to the Attorney General, there is no
single definition of discrimination; rather, the court must derive the
227. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). In the preamble of the regulations, the Attorney General defined
"the most integrated setting" as "a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with
non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, supra note 54, at *8 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A § 35.130, at 469
(1996)).
228. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 54,
at *8. The Attorney General explained that, in certain circumstances, the integration regulation
does not mandate such placement of disabled individuals. See id. These circumstances arise
when the disabled individual is not qualified for community treatment or when the State can show
that providing community-based treatment would fundamentally alter the services it provides.
See id.
229. See id. at *9.
230. See id. The Attorney General also noted that such an interpretation is "controlling" un-
less it is "plainly erroneous" or "inconsistent with the regulation." Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). Because the Attorney General's interpretation of the
integration regulation accords with its plain language, this deferential standard is met. See id.
231. 28 C.F.R. § 35 app. A, at 487 (1999).
232. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
54, at *l 1-12. The opportunity for the Attorney General to refute this argument arose in the con-
text of Olmstead. The petitioners in Olmstead argued that Title II's prohibition on "discrimina-
tion" based on disability requires a showing that similarly situated individuals have been treated
differently and that when a state offers a service only to persons with disabilities, i.e. institutional
living, such a showing of dissimilar treatment cannot be made. See id.
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meaning of discrimination from the context of the statute in which it is
provided.233 Therefore, the Attorney General correctly concluded that,
under the ADA, unnecessary isolation or segregation of disabled
individuals constitutes discrimination based on disability.
234
3. The Legislative History of the ADA
The legislative history of the ADA confirms that when Congress
enacted the ADA, it understood that and intended for unjustified
segregation of persons with disabilities to be a discriminatory practice
prohibited by the statute. 235  Numerous statements show this
understanding. 236  For example, at a hearing before the Senate
Subcommittee, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, who testified on
behalf of President Bush, stated that a life of isolation is intolerable, that
individuals with disabilities are often shut out of the mainstream of
American life, that such individuals deserve to participate in society,
and that such individuals should have access to all aspects of
community life.237 During the hearings, disabled individuals also
described the brutal treatment and unnecessary isolation that occurs in
institutions. 238 Additionally, many state administrators testified on the
233. See id. at *12 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)). The Attorney General
also noted that the Supreme Court has stated that "the concept of discrimination is susceptible of
varying interpretations." Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284
(1978)). Moreover, the Supreme Court has also stated "the term discrimination is 'inherently'
ambiguous." Id. (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983)).
234. See id.
235. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *25.
236. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. III, at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.A.A.N. 445, 448; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 332; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989).
237. See Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 195 (1989) (statement of
Dick Thornburgh, U.S. Attorney General). The Attorney General stated "individuals with dis-
abilities ... [are] still shut out of the economic and social mainstream of American life ... [and
deserve] full participation in and access to all aspects of society." Id. Senator Weicker noted
that:
For years, this country has maintained a public policy of protectionism toward people
with disabilities. We have created monoliths of isolated care in institutions and in seg-
regated educational settings. It is that isolation and segregation that has become the
basis of the discrimination faced by many disabled people today. Separate is not equal.
Id. at 215.
238. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *25-26 (citing Oversight Hearing on H.R.
4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Educa-
tion of the House Comm. On Education and Labor, 100th Cong. 27-38 (1988)). One individual
stated that "[p]eople with mental disorders have been herded into jail-like asylums .... Mental
patients have [been] isolated, chained and beaten, and abused .... Our clients face exclusion
from jobs, housing, and the basic rights citizens enjoy." Id. at *26 (citing Report on P.L. 101-
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exclusion and abuse faced by individuals with disabilities who are
confined to institutions.239
The committee reports confirm that Congress intended the ADA to
ban unnecessary segregation and to include such isolation in the ADA's
definition of discrimination. 240 The congressional purpose of the ADA,
as declared in these reports, was to provide a "comprehensive national
mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and
to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social
mainstream of American life .... 241 One report describes
"segregation as a form of discrimination prohibited by the ADA. '242
Another report stated that "the ADA ... promises a new future of
inclusion and integration, and the end of exclusion and segregation. '" 243
These reports show that Congress intended the ADA's definition of
discrimination to encompass the isolation and segregation from
mainstream society of individuals with disabilities.
Finally, the floor testimony of the congressional debates further
proves that Congress intended unnecessary institutionalization to be a
form of discrimination under the ADA.2 44  Senator Harkin, as he
introduced the ADA to Congress, explained that the ADA will not
tolerate segregation and isolation of the individuals with disabilities and
that the ADA exists to guarantee individuals with disabilities the right to
be integrated into American society.245 Senator Kennedy stated that the
ADA is designed to end the unacceptable practices "by which disabled
Americans today are segregated, excluded, fenced off from fair
participation in our society by mindless biased attitudes and senseless
physical barriers."
246
336, Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities Act, at 1161-62 (1990)).
239. See id. at *25-26.
240. See id. at *27.
241. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 10 1-485, pt. II, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 304; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989)). One of the House of Representatives Reports ex-
plicitly stated that a purpose of the ADA was "to welcome individuals with disabilities fully into
the mainstream of American society." id. at *27 n.28.
242. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6. The Senate Report states "[o]ne of the most debilitating
forms of discrimination is segregation .... Discrimination also includes exclusion, or denial of
benefits, services, or other opportunities that are as effective and meaningful as those provided to
others." Id.
243. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 111, at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 445,449.
244. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *30-31.
245. See id. at *30 (citing 135 CONG. REC. S10713 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989)). Senator Harkin,
as he introduced the ADA, also stated that the ADA's purpose is "getting people ... out of insti-
tutions." Id.
246. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. S4993 (daily ed. May 9, 1989)).
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B. Courts Have Construed § 504 to Prohibit Unnecessary Segregation
To support the conclusion that discrimination under the ADA
requires a showing that a disabled individual experienced unequal
treatment vis-A-vis a similarly situated individual based on a statutorily
described characteristic, the dissent argued that under § 504 courts have
applied the "commonly understood" meaning of discrimination. 247 The
dissent, however, failed to recognize that prior to the enactment of the
ADA, judicial interpretations of § 504 were inconsistent. Namely,
while some courts construed § 504 to require a showing of disparate
treatment of different groups, other courts construed § 504 to prohibit
unnecessary institutionalization of the disabled.248 Moreover, the
dissent failed to recognize that Congress sought to end this judicial
confusion with the enactment of the ADA.24 9
From the time § 504 was enacted, the Department of Justice
construed § 504 as prohibiting unnecessary segregation of disabled
individuals. 250 The United States, both as amicus curiae in court cases
brought by disabled individuals and as plaintiff, advanced this
position. 251 Moreover, at least three lower-court decisions held that §
504 prohibits unnecessary segregation of disabled individuals. 252 Other
courts, however, have not construed § 504 to ban unnecessary
institutionalization. 253  Even so, this inconsistency in the rulings
illustrates that the dissent erred when it concluded that, in order to show
discrimination under § 504, the claimant must prove that he or she
received differential treatment vis-A-vis members of a different group.
A more accurate statement is that courts interpreting § 504 vary in
247. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2196 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting), affirming in
part and vacating in part 138 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1998).
248. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
54, at *24-25; see also supra note 54 (citing cases that have construed § 504 to prohibit unneces-
sary segregation and cases that construed § 504 not to prohibit unnecessary institutionalization).
249. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332; S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (describing Congress' observation that the pre-ADA laws for
protection of the disabled were inadequate, and that there existed a need to devise comprehensive
legislation to eliminate discrimination against the disabled).
250. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *39.
251. See id. (citing Post Trial Memorandum of the United States, at 5-26 in Kentucky Ass'n
for Retarded Citizens v. Conn., Civ. Ac. No. C-78-0157-L(A) (W.D.KY June 18, 1979); Post-
Hearing Brief of Plaintiffs and Amicus Curiae United States, at 186-188 in Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ.
Ac. No. 3195-N, (N.D. Ala. Feb. 18, 1979)).
252. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
54, at *24; see also supra note 54 (citing cases decided under § 504.)
253. See Brief for Petitioners, L.C. v. Olmstead, 1999 WL 54623, at *26, 119 S. Ct. 2176
(1999) (No. 98-536) (citing Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (later limited in Helen L.
v. Didario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995)); Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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requiring claimants to show disparate treatment in comparison to
another group.
Congress recognized the confusion over whether § 504 required a
showing of disparate treatment in comparison to a similarly situated
group when it created the ADA.2 54 Importantly, Congress noted the
judicial confusion over § 504 and explicitly stated that the ADA was
intended to clarify § 504, so that with unmistaken clarity, the ADA
would prohibit unnecessary segregation of individuals with
disabilities. 255 This further illustrates that the dissent erroneously relied
on § 504 to demonstrate that the ADA requires a showing that the
claimant received disparate treatment vis-a-vis a different group. For
the reasons stated above, the ADA does not so require, and it explicitly
prohibits unnecessary institutionalization.
C. The Majority's Correct Construction of the Fundamental
Alterations Defense
Not only did the majority correctly conclude that unnecessary
institutionalization constitutes discrimination under Title II of the ADA,
it also correctly construed the fundamental alterations defense to
provide a state with a defense when it is unable to immediately fulfill a
qualified disabled individual's request for community-based
treatment. 256  Moreover, the majority's construction of the states'
defense will likely ensure evenhanded treatment of mentally disabled
individuals who receive care and treatment from the state. 257
The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's construction of the
fundamental alterations defense, which allowed a state a defense only
when the state could show that providing community-based treatment
for a particular individual would be unreasonable, given the state's
entire mental health budget. 258  The manner in which the majority
construed the defense will be more useful to the states. The majority
held that a state may use the fundamental alterations defense whenever
254. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *41-42.
255. See id. "Moreover, 17 years of experience with section 504... and in the interpretation
of [that] law have demonstrated the need for further legislative action in this area." Id. (citing
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. IV, at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 513); see also
supra note 64 (summarizing the congressional findings within the ADA, specifically that dis-
crimination exists in areas of "institutionalization").
256. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2188-89 (1999), affirming in part and vacating in
part 138 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1998).
257. See id. at 2189.
258. See L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1998), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999); see also Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188.
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it can show that in the allocation of all of its available resources for
disabled individuals, the immediate placement of the disabled individual
in community-based care would be more expensive than institutional
care and therefore inequitable in comparison to other disabled
individuals in need of treatment and services.259 This construction will
allow states to resist the transfer of a qualified mentally disabled
individual if making the transfer would result in lessening the
availability of funds for the care and treatment of other mentally
disabled individuals within the state. 260 This construction of the defense
will ensure that the states provide treatment and care to individuals with
disabilities with an even hand because it allows the state to look at the
financial effects of a requested transfer in light of the state's obligation
to provide similar services to other disabled individuals and allows the
states to decline the request if doing so would leave the state with less
resources to provide care and services to other individuals. 261  The
majority, therefore, construed the fundamental alterations defense to
protect the states and to ensure evenhanded treatment of all mentally
disabled individuals who receive treatment and care from the state.
V. IMPACT
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead will lead to the
transfer of qualified mentally disabled individuals from institutional
settings to community-based settings, it will not result in the mass
deinstitutionalization of a vast number of mentally disabled
Americans. 262  Furthermore, this transfer will not lead to increased
costs to the states because community-based programs generally cost
259. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2189-90. It is unlikely that the states will need to use the
fundamental alterations defense when a qualified individual with a mental disability makes a re-
quest for community-based care because community care generally costs less than institutional
care. See infra Part V.A.2 (comparing the costs of institutionalization and community-based care
and concluding that community-based care is less expensive to the states).
260. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2189.
261. See id. at 2189-90.
262. Cf. id. at 2191 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy, elaborating
on his position, stated "it would be a tragic event.., were the [ADA] to be interpreted so that
States had some incentive, for fear of litigation, to drive those in need of medical care and treat-
ment out of appropriate care and into settings with too little assistance and supervision. It is
not.., the ADA's mission to drive States to move institutionalized patients into an inappropriate
setting, such as a homeless shelter." Id.; see also L.C., 138 F.3d at 901. The majority agreed, in
stating, "[w]e emphasize that our holding does not mandate the deinstitutionalization of individu-
als with disabilities." Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2187; see also Brief for 58 Former State Commis-
sioners and Directors of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, et al., as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, 1999 WL 143935, at *4, Olmstead v. L.C. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999)
(No. 98-536).
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less than institutional care.263  Additionally, Olmstead will have a
positive effect on many disabled individuals who qualify for
community-based treatment and who will now be able to obtain
maximum independence and integration into the community, while
receiving the support and treatment they need. 264
A. The Effects of Olmstead v. L. C. on the States
The Supreme Court's conclusion that unnecessary institutionalization
is discrimination under the ADA will lead to the transfer of many
qualified individuals to community-based care. It will not, however,
result in the mass deinstitutionalization of the mentally disabled
population. States are concerned about the financial burden caused by
the transfer of mentally disabled individuals who qualify for
community-based treatment, but the states will not experience an
increased financial burden because community care, on average, costs
less than institutional care.265  In fact, states may obtain federal funds
through the Medicaid "Waiver" program to assist them in providing
such services within the community. 266
1. Olmstead v. L.C. Will Not Result in Mass Deinstitutionalization
The requirement that states provide community-based treatment to
mentally disabled individuals to avoid discrimination under Title II of
the ADA will not result in careless deinstitutionalization of large
numbers of institutionalized mentally disabled patients. 267 The decision
263. See infra Part V.A.2 (analyzing the financial savings to the states associated with com-
munity-based care).
264. See infra Part V.B (discussing the positive impact of community-based care on disabled
individuals who have previously been institutionalized); see also Paul J. Carling, Major Mental
Illness, Housing and Supports: The Promise of Community Integration, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 969,
971-72 (1990) (summarizing the shift from institutional to community-based care); Brief of Na-
tional Mental Health Consumers' Self-Help Clearinghouse et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, 1999 WL 143940, Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536).
265. See, e.g., Wayne S. Fenton, M.D. et al., Randomized Trial of General Hospital and Resi-
dential Alternative Care for Patients with Severe and Persistent Mental Illness, 155 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 516 (1998) (concluding that for patients who do not require intensive medical inter-
vention, community-based care provides outcomes comparable to those of institutional care);
Laird W. Heal, Institutions Cost More Than Community Services, 92 AM J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY
136, 137 (1987) (finding "incontrovertible evidence" that institutions are inherently more expen-
sive than community services).
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1994 & Supp. II1 1997).
267. See Brief for 58 Former State Commissioners and Directors of Mental Health and Devel-
opmental Disabilities, supra note 262, at *4-5. "This case is not about 'deinstitutionalization' in
the sense of widespread closure of institutions and the release of all patients into the community,
whether qualified or not, with or without appropriate care .... The ADA does not require states
to undertake 'massive deinstitutionalization."' Id. (citing L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 902
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also will not result in the widespread closure of state-run institutions for
the disabled.268 As explained by Justice Ginsburg, the decision in
Olmstead allows the states to rely on their own treatment professionals
to determine whether an individual "meets the essential eligibility
requirements" for habilitation in a community-based treatment
setting.269 If an individual fails to meet these required qualifications,
the individual must remain within the institution, as it would be
inappropriate for the treatment professionals to recommend community
placement. 270 Regardless of the determination of the state treatment
professionals, a state will not force a mentally disabled individual out of
his or her institutional setting. Rather, the ADA mandates only that a
qualified individual be placed in the setting that will most appropriately
cater to his or her needs. 27 1
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg explicitly stated that nothing within the
majority opinion requires mentally disabled individuals to enter into a
community-based treatment setting if they would prefer to stay in the
institutional setting.272  As a result, if a mentally disabled individual
feels uncomfortable with the freedom associated with community-based
treatment, he or she does not have to leave the institution. 273 Therefore,
no mass deinstitutionalization of the mentally disabled will result from
the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead.
2. Institutions Cost More Than Community-Based Settings
Congress has found that community placements are less expensive,
on average, than institutional care. 274  Moreover, numerous research
studies comparing the costs and benefits of community care to
institutionalization have concluded that community care is the most
(11 th Cir. 1998)); see also Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2191 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in the judgment), affirming in part and vacating in part 138 F.3d 893 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
268. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2187. The Court stated: "We emphasize that nothing in the
ADA or its implementing regulations condones termination of institutional settings for persons
unable to handle or benefit from community settings." Id.
269. Id. at 2188. The Court cites to the integration regulation, which requires an individual to
be placed in the most integrated setting appropriate for the individual and not in the most inte-
grated setting available. See id. at 2189.
270. See id. at 2188.
271. See id.
272. See id. "Nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability
to accept an accommodation ... which such individual chooses not to accept." Id. (quoting 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (1999)).
273. See id.
274. See S. REP. No. 101-273, at 25-26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 862, 886-87.
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cost-effective way to provide services to people with mental
disabilities. 275
For example, a 1995 study conducted for the American Journal of
Mental Retardation found that providing community-based care to
individuals with disabilities is more cost effective than providing care
within an institution. 276 It also found that state-owned institutions were
the most expensive setting in which to provide services to the
disabled. 277  Furthermore, in addition to being more expensive than
community care, the costs of institutional care are rising. 278 Therefore,
in the future, states will benefit more from transferring qualified
disabled individuals into community-based settings.
3. The Medicaid "Waiver" Program Will Provide States With Federal
Funds for Community Programs
Because community-based settings are less expensive, on average,
than institutional settings, the states may now be able to save money
while providing care to the disabled.279 Moreover, with the aid of
275. See, e.g., Edward M. Campbell & Laird W. Heal, Government Cost of Providing Services
for Individuals with Developmental Disabilities: Prediction of Costs, Rates and Staffing by Pro-
vider and Client Characteristics, 100 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 17 (1995) (finding institu-
tions to be the most costly and community-based agencies to be the least costly); Heal, supra note
265, at 136-38 (concluding state-run institutions are inherently more expensive than community
services); William H. Sledge, M.D. et al., Day Hospital/Crisis Respite Care Versus Inpatient
Care, Part II: Service Utilization and Costs, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1074 (1996) (determining
that, on average, institutionalization of acutely ill psychiatric patients was more expensive than
outpatient community-based treatment).
276. See Campbell & Heal, supra note 275, at 18.
277. See id. A major reason that institutional care is more expensive than community-based
care is the high cost of overhead. See Brief for 58 Former Commissioners and Directors of Men-
tal Health and Developmental Disabilities, supra note 262, at * 14. Because institutions are "total
care environments" they must recreate many of the services that are part of the background of
daily life. See id. The provision of services in an institution "requires significant additional ex-
penditures for facility and vehicle maintenance, utilities, and other fixed costs for the operation of
separate facilities, as well as compensation for workforce of cafeteria workers, janitors, and bus
drivers." Cook, supra note 26, at 464.
278. See Brief for 58 Former State Commissioners and Directors of Mental Health and Devel-
opmental Disabilities, supra note 262, at *14. "During the 1992-1996 period, the national aver-
age institutional daily costs [for people with developmental disabilities] advanced from $210 to
$258." Id. (quoting DAVID BRADDOCK, THE STATE OF THE STATES IN DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 27 (5th ed. 1998)). When adjusted for inflation, this represents a 10% increase in
total costs of running institutions over a five year period. See id. The financial costs of treating
people with mental illness in institutions is also on the rise. See id. This is due, in part, to the fact
that many institutions are aging and require significant maintenance expenditures. See id. The
development of community-based services, however, generally does not require such capital ex-
penditures to maintain because many of the community-based treatment centers exist in small,
rented or leased buildings. See id. at * 15.
279. See id.; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
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federal funds through the Medicaid "Waiver" program, states will
realize even greater financial savings by providing community-based
treatment settings to qualified individuals with disabilities.280
The Medicaid "Waiver" program, created in 1981, permits states to
apply to the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") for a
waiver of certain Medicaid rules in order to offer community-based
services. 281 Under this program, the government grants states partial
funding for mental health and developmental disability services. 282
Currently, funding from Medicaid "Waiver" programs provides
between 50% and 83% of the total Medicaid costs for community-based
care. 283  This is the same amount of federal contribution available to
states for institutional care. 284
The Home and Community Based Services waiver program is a
specific program under the Medicaid "Waiver" program that provides
large grants for community-based treatment for developmentally
disabled individuals. 285  This program allows states to use Medicaid
funds to provide services in the community to individuals with
developmental disabilities. 286 This program has become the primary
means of serving people with developmental disabilities in the
community and will relieve much of the financial responsibility form
note 54, at *20 ("Virtually all the relevant literature documents that segregating handicapped
people in large, impersonal institutions is the most expensive means of care.").
280. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
54, at *20-21.
281. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
282. See Brief for 58 Former State Commissioners and Directors of Mental Health and Devel-
opmental Disabilities, et al., supra note 262, at *9.
283. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
54, at *20.
284. See id. at 20-21; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)(b). State-run psychiatric hospitals are
generally ineligible for Medicaid funding. Thus, states will benefit from moving qualified men-
tally ill individuals into community-based settings in order to receive the Medicaid funding. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 54, at *21.
285. See Brief for 58 Former State Commissioners and Directors of Mental Health and Devel-
opmental Disabilities, et al., supra note 262, at * 10.
286. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1); see also 44 C.F.R. § 441.300 (1999). The "waiver" pro-
gram allows states to offer an array of services and programs in home and community-based set-
tings that an individual will need to remain in the community and not in an institution. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). As a result of the Home and Community Based
Services program, states have been able to afford to move countless individuals from institutions
into less expensive community-based treatment settings. See Brief of 58 Former State Commis-
sioners and Directors of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, et al., supra note 262, at
*10.
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the states to provide services to disabled individuals who, after
Olmstead, will be entitled to community-based treatment.287
B. The Benefits of Olmstead v. L. C. for Individuals with Mental
Disabilities
Olmstead provides the mentally disabled population with the right to
community-based treatment when such treatment is appropriate for the
individuals' needs. 288 The professional literature shows that disabled
individuals who receive community living arrangements derive greater
benefits than those confined to institutions. 289  These benefits include
increased in socialization of disabled individuals with non-disabled
individuals, improved health, and an increased likelihood that the
disabled individual will live, work, and recreate in regular community
settings.290  Moreover, individuals with disabilities generally prefer
community-based treatment settings to institutional settings.291
When disabled individuals are segregated from the community, they
lose the ability to bond with others and to take part in the life of the
community because the segregation substantially limits their ability to
interact with members of the community. 292  Studies show that when
placed in the community, disabled individuals can successfully establish
287. See Brief of 58 Former State Commissioners and Directors of Mental Health and Devel-
opmental Disabilities, et al., supra note 262, at *10. Since 1992 the number of individuals who
have been served by the Home and Community Based Services program under Medicaid has in-
creased 29.2%. See id. at *10-11 (citing Gary Smith et al., The HCB Waiver Program: The
Fading of Medicaid's "Institutional Bias," MENTAL RETARDATION 262 (1996)). States may also
be concerned about the costs incurred in the transition of the institutionalized disabled individuals
to community-based settings. See id. at *12. These short term costs will likely be offset by the
federal funding available to the states through the Medicaid "Waiver" program. See id.
288. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2190 (1999), affirming in part and vacating in
part 138 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1998).
289. See Brief for National Mental Health Consumers' Self-Help Clearinghouse, supra note
264, at *22. A survey of eighteen studies conducted between 1976 and 1988 found that every
study reported positive gains in the development of adaptive behavior and skills of disabled indi-
viduals living in community-based settings. See Brief for American Association on Mental Re-
tardation, et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 1999 WL 143937, at *15, Olin-
stead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536) (citing SHERYL LARSON & CHARLIE LAKIN,
THE U NIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA INSTITUTE ON COMMUNITY INTEGRATION,
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSON WITH MENTAL RETARDATION: THE IMPACT ON DAILY
LIVING SKILLS (March 1988)).
290. See Cook, supra note 26, at 452-55.
291. See Holmes, supra note 1, at A4.
292. See Cook, supra note 26, at 451. Institutionalization, by definition, entails segregation
and isolation of disabled individuals. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *9. Segrega-
tion of the sexes is prevalent, as is segregation of individuals from their families, friends, normal
society, and peer groups. See id. Patients in institutions generally have almost no contact with
non-disabled individuals. See id.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 31
and maintain social relationships. 293  Moreover, disabled individuals
and non-disabled individuals develop much stronger bonds when the
disabled individual has a high degree of contact with others within the
community.294
In addition to increased socialization, disabled individuals who live
within the community generally gain greater independence and are more
likely to work in community settings. 295 This is largely a result of the
individual's opportunity to learn new skills and to receive appropriate
community support, which by definition an institutional setting cannot
provide. 296  Community-based treatment provides for more
opportunities for disabled individuals to learn new skills and adaptive
behavior, thereby enabling them to better function within the
community. 297 When disabled individuals learn these skills, they
generally become less dependent on others for aid and assistance. 298
Olmstead will enable qualified disabled individuals to live within the
community and experience the aforementioned benefits. Additionally,
disabled individuals overwhelmingly prefer community placement to
institutional placement. 299 In a brief to the Supreme Court as Amici to
293. See Cook, supra note 26, at 451.
294. See id. at 450. One study showed that when disabled individuals are regularly exposed to
non-disabled individuals, the rates of inappropriate behavior of the disabled individual decreased
substantially. See id. This often contributes to the development of genuine and lasting friend-
ships, which provides a positive influence on the disabled individuals. See id.
295. See id.
296. See Brief for National Mental Health Consumers' Self-Help Clearinghouse, et al., supra
note 264, at *22-23. Institutions, by definition, cannot provide community support and adequate
opportunity for learning adaptive skills because individuals within institutions are frequently con-
fined within the institution and segregated and isolated from community members and commu-
nity supports. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at *9.
297. See James Conroy et al., A Matched Comparison of the Developmental Growth of Insti-
tutionalized and Deinstitutionalized Mentally Retarded Clients, 86 AM. J. OF MENTAL
DEFICIENCY 581, 586 (1982). Individuals discharged from state institutions showed significant
improvement in functioning and behaviors. See id. at 584.
298. See id. at 587. Individuals in community settings develop fuller and become more inde-
pendent than they ever could in an institution-they attend movies, go shopping, and enjoy parks
and recreation, all of which is essentially impossible to do in an institution. See Brief for Ameri-
can Association on Mental Retardation, et al., supra note 289, at *13. Not only do disabled indi-
viduals become more independent when living in community-based treatment settings, but they
are exposed to a much wider array of services than institutions offer. See Brief for National
Mental Health Consumers' Self-Help Clearinghouse, et al., supra note 264, at *18-19. Such
services include: comprehensive treatment programs, which are designed to evaluate the extent of
the individuals needs; residential services, which include support services for independent living;
and rehabilitation services, which are designed to improve living skills and assist in gaining the
maximum amount of independence and productivity. See id. Moreover, support services com-
monly assist the disabled individual with skills for daily living and assure that the individual has
the access to resources such as entitlement benefits and medical care. See id.
299. See Brief for National Mental Health Consumers' Self-Help Clearinghouse, et al., supra
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Respondents L.C. and E.W., the National Mental Health Consumers'
Self-Help Clearinghouse conducted interviews with disabled
individuals, who were living within a community-based setting, but who
had previously spent time in an institutional setting.300 The individuals
interviewed had experienced a great increase in fulfillment and
productivity as workers and volunteers in the community and a more
rapid recovery as they learned to make choices, learned new skills, and
formed meaningful relationships. 30 1 Most importantly, the individuals
showed and expressed an increase in life satisfaction and overall
happiness as they settled into the community settings, experienced more
independence, and developed previously unrecognized skills.30 2  Many
of the individuals noticed a reduction in their symptoms and expressed
happiness over the increased freedom associated with community
living.3 3 Overall, each expressed that he or she felt better about him or
note 264, at *5.
300. See id. The National Mental Health Consumers' Self-Help Clearinghouse is a national
technical assistance center run by and for people who are consumers of psychiatric services. See
id. at * 1. Its mission is to promote the participation in planning, providing, and evaluating mental
health and community support services and to provide technical assistance and information to
consumers of mental health services and survivors of psychiatric illness. See id.
301. See id. at *5.
302. See id. at *9. One interviewee, Mr. Kennedy, born with cerebral palsy and placed in an
institution at the age of five, remained there until he won his release when he turned 21. See id.
He described his experience:
[During his institutionalization,] all [he and the others] did was watch Sesame
Street... [and] put pegs in a peg board, [and] took naps .... The staff members who
cared didn't stay for very long. They couldn't stand to stay and watch what was going
on, which included the use of cattle prods and ammonia sprayed in the eyes as punish-
ment.
Id. at *9-10. Once released from the institution, Mr. Kennedy earned his GED and got married.
See id. Regarding his life in the community, Mr. Kennedy stated:
We're very well known and respected in our neighborhood. We enjoy going away on
vacation, we go to the movies, we do the same things anyone would do .... Freedom
means a lot-that I am somebody, regardless of what my limitations are. What I advo-
cate for is that people like me can live a normal life, regardless of their disability. Part
of my job is to make sure that they get a fair shot.
Id. at *11-12.
303. See id. at *14. For example, Ms. Donahue, who has schizophrenia, described her in-
creased privacy, opportunity for making her own choices, and reduction of symptoms that oc-
curred after the state provided her with integrated services in the community. See id. She said:
It's better living in my house [than in the hospital] .... It's much better, because you
have staff 24 hours a day like in the hospital but you can go to the bank, shopping, or
Rite-Aid. It's better out here. It feels like you're in your normal home. You can't live
in the hospital all your life.
Id. at *14-15.
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herself as a result of the transfer from the institution to the
community.
30 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court correctly concluded that the ADA includes unnecessary
institutionalization and segregation in its definition of discrimination
and that states must provide community-based care to qualified
individuals with mental disabilities in order to avoid discrimination
under the ADA. The plain language of the ADA bans unnecessary
segregation. Moreover, this is supported by the consistent interpretation
of the ADA by the Attorney General and the legislative history of the
ADA. As a result of Olmstead, disabled individuals who have spent
many years segregated from society and confined to institutions will
finally be placed in community-based settings and will have the
opportunity to live independent and productive lives.
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304. See id.
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